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ABSTRACT
Researchers in a variety of disciplines have recommended the use
of multiple conflicting data analyses to improve managerial decision-
making through the challenging of assumptions. This study dealt with
the effects of single data analyses and conflicting analyses on managers'
solutions to a case analysis task. Results showed that managers who
received conflicting analyses produced solutions with higher expected
profits than those who received single analyses. Implications for the
use of analytic decision aids are drawn.

INTRODUCTION
Analytic models grounded in the Decision Sciences paradigm, such
as decision analysis, have long been used to assist executives in making
complex decisions. Such models provide structure for complex problems
and enable managers to quantify some of the uncertainties associated with
decisions. However, consultants and staff people who help managers to
apply these models bring their own perspectives and assumptions into the
process of structuring clients' organizational problems. These assumptions
help to determine the way the problem is formulated and the types of
solutions proposed.
It has been suggested that these assumptions may negatively effect
the quality of solutions to organizational problems and that they should
be challenged as a way of improving organizational decision-making. In
e
a previous paper [20] we decribed a policy dialogue process involving
the development and presentation of conflicting analyses or models to
decision-makers as a way of improving the ef f ectivesness of analytic models
in organizational decision-making. In this paper, the results of a labor-
atory experiment on the value of conflicting problem analyses are discussed,
This experiment, involving business executives, demonstrated that presen-
tation of conflicting analyses was more effective than a single analysis
in improving decision-making performance.
Effects of Unchallenged Assumptions on Decision-Making
Those applying analytic models to the solution of organizational
problems often act in the capacity of process consultants or experts. By
using these models with their underlying assumptions, they may bias
decisions, particularly if their assumptions are not articulated so that
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management clearly understands then. Carter [3] has discussed the effects
of expert bias on organizational decisions and the conditions under
which this bias may have the strongest impact. He suggests that experts
tend to bias their recommendations and proposals to a greater extent if
the following conditions hold:
A) The success of the project depends on the top-level decision-
makers' acceptance of the staff's representation of the relevant
issues in the problems.
B) There is uncertainty in data relevant to the problem.
C) The top-level decision-makers possess much less knowledge
about the problem than do the staff people.
D) The top-level decision-makers perceive a great deal of uncertainty
in the problem and a need for the expertise of the staff.
Those who apply analytic models to generate solutions to organizational
problems often do so in situations involving a great deal of uncertainty,
situations in which they have much more knowledge about the appropriate
way of constructing the model than do the managers who are responsible
for the decision [1], [2], [21]. Therefore, Carter's research suggests
that there is little chance that assumptions and possible biases will be
challenged in these applications.
Mason and Mitroff [15] have stressed the danger of unexamined
assumptions in organizational decisions. They suggest that when experts
present analyses of organizational problems, their assumptions are "hidden"
in these analyses. These assumptions, often buried by jargon, reduce
the apparent complexity of the decision problem, possibly at the expense
of solution quality [15, pp. 127-128].
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Because unchallenged assumptions and biases may result in the
selection of poor solutions to organizational problems, it has
been suggested that procedures should be used to expose and challenge
assumptions underlying analytic models. Mason and Mitroff [15] have
suggested that managers should observe and feel the conflict between
two alternative analyses of a problem in order to identify key assumptions
underlying each alternative [15, p. 194], They also point out the value
of decision-making aids which ^llow managers to participate in problem
definition [15, p. 16].
Conflicting Analysis and Assumption Challenging
To assist managers in challenging the assumptions underlying expert
analyses, some researchers have proposed the development of conflicting
analyses based on alternative assumptions. The devil's advocate (DA)
and dialectical inquiry (DI) are two specific techniques for presenting
conflicting data analyses. The DI was proposed as an aid to corporate
decision-making by Mason [14] . Mason suggested that a dialectical ap-
proach to decision-making involves examining an organizational decision
situation completely and logically from two different and opposing points
of view. First, a prevailing or recommended plan is identified, along with
the data which were used to derive it. An attempt is then made to identify
the assumptions underlying the plan. Next, a counterplan is developed which
is feasible, politically viable, and generally credible but which rests on
assumptions which are the opposite of those supporting the plan. A struc-
tured debate is then conducted in which those responsible for making the
decision hear arguments in support of both the plan and the counterplan.
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This debate, in contrast to a traditional manr.^ament briefing, consists
of a forceful presentation of two opposing plans which rest on different
interpretations of the same organizational data bank.
The DI approach is, according to Mason [14], distinctly superior
to what he calls the expert (E) approach which is seen as the most com-
mon approach to top management decision-making. In this approach,
members of a planning department or consultants provide expert advice
and recommendations regarding the plans the organization should follow.
Mason suggests that the planning recommendations contain hidden assump-
tions which are very frequently not communicated to management. This
is one of the most critical drawbacks to this approach [17, pp. B406-
B407],
Another widely recommended aid to strategy formulation is the DA
approach [4], [7], [9], [10], In this approach, a planner appears before
the organization's management and advocates a plan in a manner similar to
that of the E method. Management or another planner then takes the role
of an adverse and often carping critic of the plan. An attempt is made
_to determine all that is wrong with the plan and to expound the reasons
why the plan should not be adopted. Mason suggests that while this
approach does expose some underlying assumptions, it does so in the
context of what is wrong with them rather than what they should be.
It does not serve to develop a new managerial world view. For this
reason, Mason feels that the DI should be more helpful than the DA
approach [14, pp. B407-B408] .
Both the DA and DI involve the use of conflicting analyses to promote
deeper understanding of the problem and improve solution quality. There
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is some disagreement about whether the DI plan-counterplan format is more
effective than the DA plan-critique format. Field experiments have shown
that the DI has positive effects [8], [16], [17] while a number of laboratory
experiments have shown few positive effects for the DI but have supported
the value of the DA [4], "[5], [6], [23], [24].
Both the DA and DI are conflict-based approaches. Therefore, both
the field and laboratory experiments show that the use of conflicting
analyses of data has positive effects on the quality of managers' solu-
tions to problems. Managers in the field experiments report that this
conflicting presentation of data through the DI plan-counterplan format
improves their understanding of the strategic problem and leads to better
final solutions. In the laboratory experiments, the conflicting presen-
tation of data through the DA plan-critique format improves subjects'
solutions to a variety of decision problems.
Schwenk and Thomas [20] discuss the value of conflict and debate
in the application of decision analytic models to the definition and
solution of organizational problems [20, p. 26]. They suggest that the
presentation of alternative decision analyses developed under different
assumptions can help managers challenge these assumptions. This format
helps achieve the basic aim of analytic aids such as decision analysis
as stated by Keeney and Raiffa [11, p. 65]
...As a process, it is intended to force hard thinking
about the problem area: generation of alternatives, anticipation
of future contingencies, examination of dynamic secondary effects,
and so forth. Furthermore, a good analysis should illuminate
controversy— to find out where basic differences exist, in values
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and uncertainties, to facilitate compromise, to increase the level
of debate and undercut rhetoric—in short, "to promote good decision-
making."
According to Schwenk and Thomas, single decision analyses serve to
structure managers' view of a problem and may introduce biases into the
decision process. The development and presentation of alternative analyses
based on different assumptions serves to clarify these assumptions and
draw managers' attention to them. For this reason it improves decision
quality. The present study tests the validity of these propositions by
examining the effectiveness of single versus conflicting analyses on man-
agers' solutions to a case analysis task.
METHOD
Thirty-eight mid-to-upper level public and private sector managers in
an Executive MBA program served as subjects in the study. Approximately
two-thirds were from private sector companies and one-third were from public
sector organizations. They were given a case which was a modified version
of one used by McCrimmon [12] called the Sweetsa case (see Appendix 1).
This task is representative of complex managerial decision-making in a
variety of ways. It requires managers to develop rules for action (in
this case, harvest rules for a sugar plantation) based on prior prob-
abilities which they had to calculate (in this case, prior probabilities
of favorable harvest conditions). They were also required to make decisions
about purchasing information based on the potential costs and benefits
of the information. Thus this case requires many of the types of decisions
analytical techniques are designed to assist. As McCrimmon notes this
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case cannot be solved easily through developing algorithms to find the
optimal solution. However, norms of dominance and heuristics can be
devised to reduce the space of feasible alternatives.
The percentage of managers who developed infeasible solutions in
MacCrimmon's study provides further evidence that this task is challenging
to managers. In this study, 22 of the 60 executives (37%) given the case
developed infeasible solutions. McCrimmon suggested that this indicates
the task was complex enough to make managers ' information processing
representative of that of managers in real world decisions [12, p. 1329].
Feasible solutions are defined as those for which subjects specified the
collection and communication of sufficient information to make their
harvest rules possible (see Appendix 1).
There was a range of feasible solutions to the case which varied
in quality (expected profit). It was possible to calculate the costs
and revenues associated with each alternative from data given in the
case. This data includes such things as the costs of information
gathering, information communication and harvesting costs (at two levels
high and low depending upon the harvest conditions) and also the revenue
data for each period. Since the problem involves three plantations (East,
West, South) operating at either of the two levels of harvest costs, high
or low, there are potentially eight joint events. However, West and
South 's costs are perfectly correlated which means that only four of the
events are possible—all these plantations having either high or low
costs; East low with the other two high or East high with the other two
low. Probabilities can then be assigned to these four events (0.1, 0.1,
0.4 and 0.4 respectively) if it can be assumed that the ten-quarter cost
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history exhibited in the case is a representative sample and that quarter-
to-quarter independence can be assumed. The expected profit can thus
be generated by weighing the net payoffs arising from each event by
their probabilities of occurrence. In this modified version of the case,
two of the possible solutions were optimal and had an expected profit
of $36,000 (see Appendix 1 for the calculation of the optimal solution).
Subjects were randomly assigned to a control (C) condition, a treat-
ment involving the presentation of a single analysis (SA) , or a treatment
involving the presentation of two conflicting analyses (CA) to subjects.
Those in the control condition received only the case and no additional
planning aids
.
Those in the SA condition were given an analysis of the case and a
set of recommendations and a potential solution which was not the optimal
solution. The analytic report in this study served the function which an
expert consultant or perhaps a decision analyst might serve, that of
structuring the problem for decision-makers and providing a 'first-pass'
analysis. The expert report contained an analysis of the case and recom-
mended that two of the three plantations commission the studies and com-
municate the results to the third, a course of action with an expected
profit of $26,000. This recommendation was chosen on the basis of an
examination of MacCrimmon's [12] results. The recommendation had a some-
what higher expected value than the average of the solutions developed by
the subjects in MacCrimmon's study who received no additional planning
recommendations and involved a reasonable set of underlying assumptions.
It was intended to represent an expert report which aids decision-makers
in structuring a problem and results in some improvement over the solutions
they would propose unaided.
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Subjects in the CA condition received all the materials given to
the SA subjects. In addition to the expert report, they also received
a second report which offered an alternative analysis of the problem,
questioned some of the assumptions in the expert report, and made
alternative recommendations. Specifically, this second report challenged
the assumption that the best strategy involved two predictive studies
and recommended that only one of the plantations commission the studies
and communicate the results to the other plantations. This statement
drew subjects' attention to the costs of studies and the efficient use
of information, as well as the importance of fixed costs and the rela-
tionship between patterns of harvest costs in the various plantations.
The expected value of this recommendation was $30,000; higher than that
of the expert report but still lower than that of the optimal solution.
It was intended to represent the efforts of a critiquing group within
the company which arrived at a different solution than that represented
in the first expert report because of a basic difference in assumptions.
RESULTS
To test the effectiveness of the SA and CA analyses at structuring
the problem, the number of feasible and infeasible solutions in the C,
SA and CA conditions were examined (see Table 1) . There were 22 feasible
solutions and 16 infeasible solutions. In addition to giving harvest
rules based on predictive studies and communication linkages, ten of the
subjects attempted to describe the relationship between the plantations'
harvest costs by specifying harvest rules for each plantation based on
harvest costs of the other two. Before these subjects' responses were
coded, they were asked to provide additional information to show that they
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understood the relationship between harvest rules, predictive studies,
and communication linkages.
Insert Table 1 about here
o-fthe
As can be seen from the table, 42%vsubjects developed infeasible
2
solutions. A x analysis on this data showed that the difference in
feasible solutions between treatment groups was marginally significant
2
(X = 4.64, p < .10). A subsequent test for differences in proportions
showed that the SA and CA subjects had a significantly greater proportion
of feasible solutions than the C subjects (Z = 2.14, p < .02).
Since the number of feasible solutions was much smaller in the C
than in the SA and CA groups, and since it is not possible to calculate
expected profits for the infeasible solutions, the C group was not com-
pared to the SA or CA groups in terms of expected profit of the recommended
solution. However, for those feasible C solutions, the average quality
of the solution was lower than in the SA or CA treatments.
Because the variances of the expected profits in the SA and CA groups
were very different, it was not possible to use a t-test to determine
whether the means were significantly different. However, a Mann-Whitney
U test on the difference between the SA and CA groups indicated those
given the CA treatment produced solutions with a higher expected profit
than those given the SA (U' = 11, p < .01). Table 2 shows expected
profits for each 'solution.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3 shows the types of decision errors made by managers in each
condition whereas Table 4 gives some insight into the characteristics
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of subjects' solutions by presenting risk profiles and number of studies
commissioned and communication links established for each solution.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
Table 3 lists the solutions offered in terms of studies commissioned,
communication links specified and harvest rules. For example, one of
the optimal solutions has been listed as (W; WS; WE; E:W W:W
,
S:W ).H L L
This bracketed form is shorthand for the following series of statements.
First, West (W) should commission a study of harvest costs. Second, West
should communicate to both South (WS) and East (WE). Third, East should
harvest if West's costs are high (E:W ), West should harvest if West's costs
n
are low (W:W ) and South should harvest if West's costs are low (S:W ). In
L L
other words by this process the West plantation manager is certain about
his cost situation for next quarter. Since there is perfect correlation
between West and South 's costs, once West has communicated his cost
position South also has perfect information about next quarter's costs.
East's costs are almost perfectly inversely related to West's costs. A
communication from West to East would, therefore, provide East with an
almost perfect indication of his cost position. This means that East
should harvest when West's costs are high (since there is then a 4/5
probability that East's cost will be low). Alternatively both West and
South should harvest when West's costs are low and avoid harvesting when
West's costs are high.
It should be noted that in the top five solutions both EV's ranging
from 26 to 36 have only a 1/10 chance of making a loss (ranging from
-11.2 to -21.2). Only three other solutions (with EV's, 20, 22 and 24)
have the same 1/10 chance of making a loss (from -11.6 to -12) and these
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are in category IV where there is a general tendency to purchase at
least two studies and two communication links. In each of the latter
three cases the distribution of payoffs is much 'tighter' (the distri-
bution made possible by commissioning too many studies and setting up
too many communication links). The average number of studies and
communication links for each treatment shows that the CA subjects tended
to commission fewer studies than the SA and C subjects and to set up
fewer communication links though this difference is not statistically
sifnificant. This indicates a more efficient use of information based
on a more clear understanding of its costs and benefits in the CA than
in the SA and C subjects.
Insert Table 5 about here
Table 5 shows briefly the nature of the infeasible solutions for
the 16 subjects not listed in Tables 3 and 4. The categories listed
reflect faulty decision rules based largely upon misrepresentations
of the complex problem situation in the case. For example, some sub-
jects suggested that East and South commission studies and then stated
that West should communicate to East. West cannot communicate to East
in this situation because it has made no observation. As was discussed
earlier in the paper, the C subjects generated the majority of infeasible
solutions, indicating that they misunderstood the relationship between
studies commissioned, information communicated, and harvest rules.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study demonstrate the potential value of the
presentation of conflicting analyses in structuring decision-makers'
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views of problems and in improving their problems solution. The results
2
of x~ analysis and test for the difference in proportions shox^ed that
the SA treatment alone provided some structure for the managers since it
provided a greater proportion of feasible solutions than were found in
the C group. Thus, this treatment served the intended function of an
analytic model in providing a thinking framework for executive decision-
making.
The results of the (/-test showed that the conflict introduced by
the CA treatment further improved the decision-makers' understanding of
the problem and hence their solution quality. Though the CA treatment
contained a slightly better recommendation than the SA treatment, this
alone cannot fully explain the differences in solution quality observed.
The difference in the SA and CA recommendations was only $4,000 while
the mean difference between the SA and CA subjects' solutions was $34,190.
Thus, the CA subjects did not out perform the SA subjects simply/ by fol-
lowing the recommendations of the second analysis. These results support
the earlier findings of Schwenk [18] that conflicting recommendations will
improve decision-makers' performance over a single recommendation as found
in the SA approach. It is interesting to note that the average expected
profit for the SA and CA groups was lower than the expected profits of
the solutions recommended in the SA and CA reports. However, the
average quality was much lower for the SA group and only slightly lower
for the CA group. This indicates subjects were not simply following
the recommendations but using them to structure the problem. The CA
apparently provided more structure than the SA treatments.
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Table 4 shows that the C and SA subjects followed the strategy of
collecting a large amount of information as compared with the CA subjects.
This is a common strategy in organizational decision-making [12, p. 1330;
13], For various reasons decision-makers often collect a great deal of
quite costly information, relatively little of which is actually used in
the decision. There is some support from Table 4 for the claim that the
SA subjects pursued this strategy to a greater extent than the CA sub-
jects. The SA subjects commissioned more studies and set up more com-
munication links on average than did the CA subjects. However,
since these studies and communication links were expensive, the strategy
of maximizing information gathered and communicated lead to a larger
number of suboptiraal solutions and a lower average expected profit than
did the strategy which the CA subjects apparently used (one of bal-
ancing benefits of information against costs). The SA subjects' behavior
thus mirrors some real-world decision-making behavior. Further, the
CA treatment may reduce decision-makers tendency to collect too much
information by focusing decision-makers' attention on the information
and assumptions critical to a particular decision.
This study offers suggestions for improving the effectiveness of
decision aids such as decision analysis in assisting managerial problem
solving. Schwenk and Thomas [20] have suggested that "first pass"
decision analysis may be used to identify and classify assumptions in
managers' initial view of a decision problem and to question these
assumptions. Once questionable assumptions have been identified, counter-
assumptions can be generated and used as the bases for subsequent
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alternative decision analyses. Analyses under conflicting assumptions
may then be presented to decision-makers to develop a more accurate
view of the problem. The present study supports these recommendations,
-16-
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TABLE 1
FEASIBLE AND INFEASIBLE SOLUTIONS BY TREATMENT
Feasible
Infeasible
c SA CA
5 8 9
9 4 3
TABLE 2
EXPECTED PROFITS FOR FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS
IN THE SA AND CA GROUPS
Treatment Values
(in thousands of dollars)
N Mean
(standard
deviation)
SA -80, -34, -42, -4
8, 22, 30, 30
8
1
-5.75
(37.32)
CA 6, 24, 26, 26
30, 36*, 36*, 36*, 36*
9 28.44
(9.23)
*optimal solution
TABLE 3
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS
Solution
Expected Number of subjects
Profit C SA CA
I) Optimal Solutions
1) (W; WS, WE; E:W„, W:W_
,
S:W_) H L
2) S; SW, SE; E:S„, W:ST ,
S:SL) H L
II) Next Best Solutions
1) (E; EW, ES; E:E_ , W:E_, S:0
2) (E, W; WS; E:E. , W:W , SsW-7
3) (E, W: ES, WS; LE:IL , W:W
,
S:EH & WL)
III) Apparent Mistakes in
Decision Rules
1) (E, W; EW, WS; E:E. , W:EL
,
S:W )
L L
2) (WjHre, WS; E:W W:W S:W )
3) (W; WE, WS; E:W~, WiWT,
S:Always) L
IV) Wasted and/or Misused Observations
or Communications
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
(E, W; EW, WE, WS; E:E. , W:W
S:W_) L L
E, W; EW, ES, WS; E:E- , W:W
S:W & F )
L L
(E, W, S; ES, SE; E:EL & S
,
W:W S:S & ELJ
L
(E, S; ES, SE, SW; E:E_ & S_
,
W:S. ~ " ' -tf:S
,
S:S & E-)
(E, W; EWV WS; E:E_ , W:W
,
S :W )
L L
(E, 1^; EW, WE, WS; E:EL & W
W:W & E_ , S:W )
L H
(E, W; EW, WE, WS; EtE, & W
W:E S:W )
L L
(E,^; EW? ES, WE, WS;
V)
E:^ & W
H ,
W:^ & W
L
,
S-.Eg & W
L)
Poor Observations or Communications
1) (E, W; E:EL, W:W SrNever
36
36
30
28
26
-40
-80
20
22
-54
-34
24
8
-42
-4
10
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
TABLE 4*
Number Treatment Risk Profile Number Numb er o
of Probabilities of Communic;colutions CA SA C EV 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 Studies Linkages
1) 3 3 — _ 36 6.8 19.2 27.2 -17.2 1
1
2
2)
I
1 1 — — 36 6.8 19.2 27.2 -17.2 1 2
1) 3 1 2 - 30 4.8 19.2 27.2 -21.2 1 2
2) 1 - - 1 28 8.8 11.2 19.2 -11.2 2 1
3) 2 2 - - 26 10.4 9.6 17.6 -11.6 2 2
II
1) 1 - - 1 -40 8.4 -22.4 -14.4
-11.6 2 2
2) 1 - 1 - -80 10.8 -36.8 -44.8 -9.2 1 2
3)
7
1 1 — — 6 6.8 -4.8 27.2 -23.2 1 2
1) 1 - - 1 20 8 8 16 -12 2 3
2) 1 - 1 - 22 10 8 16 -12 2 3
3) 1 — - 1 -54 8 -56 8 -14 3 2
4) 1 - 1 - -34 10 -48 16 -12 2 3
5) 1 1 - - 24 8.4 9.6 17.6 -11.6 2 2
6) 1 - 1 - 8 -4 8 16 -12 2 3
7) 1 — 1 - -42 8 -48 16 -18 2 3
8) 1 — 1 — -4
-12.4 6.4 14.4 -12.4 2 4
1) 1 - - 1 10 11.2 12.8 -3.2 -10.8 2
zerage # of
Studii2S
i of
1.33 1.63 2.2
rerage
)mmunication
Lnkages 2.0 2.75 1.6
Tote this table is an expansion of Table 3.
TABLE 5
DETAILS OF INFEASIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR 16 SUBJECTS*
Infeasiblitv
Communicate Information
Not Observed
Act on Information
Not Obtained
Act on Information
Not Communicated
Act on Information
Neither Observed
Nor Communicated
No Decision
Rules
Number of Treatment
Times** Condition
4 2SA
2C
8 2SA
1CA
5C
9 3SA
2CA
4C
2 ISA
1CA
3 1CA
2C
*Note of these 16 subjects, 9 received the basic Sweetsa case (the C
treatment), 4 received the Sweetsa case plus the expert-treatment (the
SA treatment) , 3 received the expert recommendation and the counterplan
( the CA treatment)
.
**Subjects sometimes exhibited more than one infeasibility
.
APPENDIX 1
THE SWEETSA CASE
Introduction:
You have been called in as a consultant to the Sweetsa Plantation,
a multi-site plantation system which grows and exports sugar in the
Philippines. You are presented with the accompanying information and
are asked to make some suggestions as to how the plantation system is
to be organized and run.
Problem Description:
The company has three geographically separate plantations of varying
efficiency. (These will be designated as the East, West, and South plan-
tations, to correspond to their geographic positions.) Each plantation
is capable of producing 1,000,000 pounds of sugar each quarter, i.e.,
each three months. Each quarter represents a different harvest subject
to different weather conditions, labor costs and availability, transpor-
tation costs, and other such cost-influencing conditions.
Each plantation has a fixed quarterly cost of $20,000 due to the
costs of land preparation, planting, land maintenance, capital and admin-
istrative costs, etc. These costs are incurred even if the plantation
is shut down. At the beginning of the quarter, the manager of each
plantation must decide whether or not the current crop (of 1,000,000 lbs.)
is to be harvested, an action which incurs the additional costs of the
harvesting, processing and shipping. Because of the uncertainty about
weather conditions throughout the quarter, labor costs, transportation
availability, etc., the expected costs may be so high that it might be
more profitable to simply let the sugar go unharvested and simply to be
plowed under for the next quarter's preparation. As noted above, these
variable costs vary widely: on the Eastern plantation, the variable
costs for harvesting the crop are $80,000 if good conditions prevail,
$300,000 if bad conditions prevail. On the Western plantation, the
variable costs are $120,000 for good conditions, $280,000 for bad; on
the Southern plantation the variable costs are $140,000 for good con-
ditions and $260,000 for bad conditions. The cost history for the past
ten quarters is as follows:
Plantation 21 22 23 24
Quarter
25 26 27 28 29 30
East
West
South
B300
G120
G140
B300
B280
B260
G 80
B280
B260
B300
G120
G140
G 80 B300
B280 G120
B260 B140
G 80
G120
G140
G 80
B280
B260
G 80
B280
B260
B300
G120
G140
(Figures are in thousands of dollars.)
The market for the sugar is in the United States, where various
licensing and import regulations, tariffs and the like have created the
following market conditions:
1) The Sweetsa Plantation can always sell the first 1,000,000 lbs.
at 22c /lb. ($220,000)
2) The second 1,000,000 lbs. will only bring 20c /lb. ($200,000),
while
3) The third 1,000,000 lbs. will bring only 12c/lb. ($120,000).
To aid the plantation managers in the making of their decisions as
to whether or not to harvest their crops and incur the variable costs,
each manager has the opportunity to commission an extensive study of his
quarterly conditions, including weather forecasts, labor supply deter-
minations, transportations studies, etc. This study will provide him
with prior information about whether the variable costs on his planta-
tion are to be high or low for that quarter. It can be assumed that
this study provides perfect information, i.e., it predicts perfectly
all the time. The cost of conducting such a study is $24,000 per
quarter for each manager who decides to take advantage of it.
Furthermore, the plantations may set up a communication system which
allows a manager to convey his own cost-information (as determined by
his commissioned study) to any other plantation manager. Each such one-
way communication between plantation managers essentially costs $4,000,
the cost of providing the communication links. So for example, East
can communicate to West and the Sweetsa Plantation incurs a cost of
$4,000 for the communication link and a cost of $24,000 to obtain East's
data. The end result is that both East and West know what the cost
conditions are for East during that quarter.
Given all of the information above, Sweetsa has asked you to develop
an optimal organizational structure and its concurrent set of decision
strategies. That is to say, you are to specify which plantation managers
are to commission the variable-cost studies, who shall communicate to
whom, and what decisions are to be made with reference to the sugar
harvesting.
EXPECTED PROFITS FOR OPTIMAL SOLUTION: (W; WS, WE; E:WU , W:WT , S:WT )a L L
Events
(Harvest Costs)
East L ( 80) L ( 80) H (300) H (300)
West L (120) K (280) L (120) H (280)
South L (140) H (260) L (140) H (260)
Probabilities of Events 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
Conditional Revenues
Market 1 220
Market 2 200
Market 3
Total 420*
Harvesting Costs
East
West 120
South 140
Total 260
Survey and
Communication
Costs 32
Fixed Costs
Total
60
92
Net Profits 68
Expected
Conditional
Profits 6.8
Total
Expected
Profit $36,000
220 220 220
200
220 420 220
80 300
120
140
80 260 300
32 32 32
60 6£ 60
92 92 92
48 68 -172
19.2 27.2 -17.2




HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
e N MANCHESTER, I
iBomJ-To-P'^ INDIANA 4696t

